跨学科合作意愿是支撑科技创新韧性的核心微观基础，但其“高开低走”的现实困境制约着我国创新系统效能的提升。为探究这一动态波动规律，文章基于演化博弈理论与跨学科协同理论，聚焦学术权力平衡、利益分配、预期收益三大核心机制，构建了科研平台与不同学科科研人员的三方演化博弈模型，并通过仿真分析了关键变量对合作意愿的影响。研究发现：学术权力平衡是合作稳定的核心，适度学科差异可激发合作意愿，权力失衡则延长稳定周期，任务中心度可作为调节抓手；收益分配公平性决定合作韧性，分配不公易引发系统性风险，可通过细分隐性与显性收益配合合作阶段调整；恰当的惩罚机制比激励更利于引导合作。最后依据研究结果提出了分级响应、权力制衡、公平分配及科学奖惩等政策建议，既为构建跨学科合作稳定性提供理论支撑，也为完善更具韧性的科技创新体系提供决策参考。

Interdisciplinary cooperation willingness serves as the core micro-foundation supporting the resilience of technological innovation, yet its practical dilemma of "high initial willingness but low sustainability" restricts the improvement of China's innovation system efficiency. To explore this dynamic fluctuation law, based on evolutionary game theory and interdisciplinary collaboration theory, this paper focuses on three core mechanisms: academic power balance, benefit distribution, and expected returns, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between research platforms and researchers from different disciplines, and analyzes the impact of key variables on cooperation willingness through simulation. The study finds that: Academic power balance is the core of stable cooperation; moderate disciplinary differences can stimulate cooperation willingness, while power imbalance prolongs the stabilization cycle, with task centrality serving as a regulatory tool. The fairness of benefit distribution determines cooperation resilience; unfair distribution is prone to cause systemic risks, which can be adjusted by subdividing implicit and explicit benefits in line with the cooperation stages. Appropriate punishment mechanisms are more conducive to guiding cooperation than incentives. Corresponding policy suggestions such as hierarchical response, power checks and balances, fair distribution, and scientific rewards and punishments are put forward, providing a theoretical basis for building the stability of interdisciplinary cooperation and a decision-making reference for improving the more resilient technological innovation system.